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ABSTRACT 
EXTENSION OF SYMMETRIC CONNECTIONS MODEL  
Mehpare Şule Taşcıer  
 M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Farhad Hüsseinov 
September, 2010 
 
In this thesis, we study an extension of symmetric connections model, which is 
presented by Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky in their paper entitled, “A 
Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks”. We examined the network 
formation process through a dynamic framework where self-interested individuals 
can form links, then we analyze to which network structures this process converges.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Symmetric connections model, static model, dynamic model. 
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ÖZET 
SİMETRİK BAĞLANTI MODELİNİN GENİŞLETİLMESİ  
  
Mehpare Şule Taşcıer 
 Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Farhad Hüsseinov 
Eylül, 2010 
 
Bu tezde Matthew O. Jackson ve Asher Wolinsky tarafından, “Sosyal  ve 
Ekonomik Ağların Stratejik bir Modeli” adlı makalelerinde sunulan simetrik bağlantı 
modelinin genişletilmesini çalıştık. Ağların oluşum sürecini dinamik bir çerçevede 
inceledik öyleki oyundaki kendi çıkarlarını düşünen bireyler kendi aralarında bağ 
yapabiliyorlardı. Sonra bu ağ yapılarının nasıl bir yapıya yaklaşacaklarını analiz 
ettik. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Simetrik Bağlantı Modeli, Durağan Model, Dinamik Model.  
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Economic situations where network structures play a significant role is wide and
varied. For example, personal contacts play critical roles in obtaining information
about job opportunities, political party networks can influence election results,
organization of workers within a firm influences the firm’s efficiency. Given both
the presence of economic situations where network structures play a role and
their importance in determining the outcome of the interaction, it is essential to
have theories about how such network structures form and why do they matter.
In his survey, Jackson emphasizes the importance of network structures through
some examples. One example, which is discussed to underlie the reasons that why
we may care about network structures, is social connections in labor economics.
Jackson underlies that the structure of the social network turns out to be the key
determinant of
i) who gets which jobs, which has implications for social mobility,
ii) how patterns of unemployment related to ethnicity, education, geography
and other variables and for instance why there might be persistent differ-
ences in employment between races,
iii) whether or not jobs are being efficiently filled,
iv) the incentives that individuals have to educate themselves and participate
in the workforce.
1
Since network structures affect economic outcomes, it is crucial to know which
network configurations will arise.
As Jackson mentioned in his survey, it is useful to crudely divide situations
where networks are important into two distinct categories, to be specific about
what the scope of this thesis will be: ”In one category, the network structure is a
distribution or service network that is the choice of a single actor”. ”In the other
category of situations where networks are critical, the network structure connects
different individuals and the formation of the network depends on the decisions
of many participants”. The model that we analyze in this thesis falls into the
second category.
We examine the process of network formation in a dynamic framework, where
self interested individuals can form or sever links. We determine which network
structures the formation process converges to. In our model, there is a set of
players who are initially not connected to each other. Over time, pairs of agents
meet and decide whether or not to form or sever links. In every period, two players
randomly meet to be updated with uniform probability. Agents can sever a link
unilaterally but formation of a link requires the agreement of both players. Agents
are myopic and their payoffs are determined through a function which is similar
to the one that is presented in Jackson and Wolinskys’symmetric connections
model.
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. In chapter two, we will first
give definitions related to network structures then we will remind Jackson and
Wolinkys’ connections model. In the third chapter, we will review Watts’ results
about dynamic network formation. In chapter four, we will present our exten-
sions of symmetric connections model and analyze conditions for complete graph
formation and then we will perform the stability analysis for these extensions.
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONNECTIONS MODEL
In this chapter, We start by explaining the Connections Model which is presented
by Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky in their paper entitled, ”A Strategic
Model of Social and Economic Networks”.
2.1 Definitions
Definition 2.1.1 Let N be the finite set of players i.e. {1, 2, 3, 4, . . . , N}. The
network relations among these players are represented by graphs such that the
nodes of the graph stand for players and its arcs represent pairwise relationships.
Definition 2.1.2 The complete graph, denoted gN , is the set of all subsets of N
with size two. The set of all possible graphs of on N is {g|g ⊂ gN}. Let ij denote
subset of N which contains the players i and j. We will refer to this set simply
as the link ij. Let g + ij denotes the graph, when the link ij is added to graph g
and g − ij denotes the graph where the link ij is deleted from the graph g.
Definition 2.1.3 Let N(g) = {i|∃j s.t. ij ∈ g} and n(g) be the cardinality of
the set N(g). A path in graph g connecting the players i1 and in is the set of
distinct nodes i.e. {i1, i2, i3, . . . , in} ⊂ N(g) such that {i1i2, i3i4, . . . , in−1in} ⊂ g.
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Definition 2.1.4 The graph g′ ⊂ g is a component of the graph g, if ∀i ∈ N(g′)
and ∀j ∈ N(g′) such that i 6= j there exists a path in g′ connecting nodes i and
j, and ∀i ∈ N(g) and ∀j ∈ N(g′), ij ∈ g implies ij ∈ g′.
Definition 2.1.5 The value of a graph is represented by a value function, v :
{g|g ⊂ gN} 7→ R. The set of all such functions is denoted by V .
Definition 2.1.6 An allocation rule Y : {g|g ⊂ gN} × V 7→ RN identifies how
the value generated by a graph is distributed across players. Yi(g, v) is the payoff
of player i from graph g under the value function v.
Definition 2.1.7 A graph g ⊂ gN is strongly efficient if v(g) ≥ v(g′), ∀g′ ⊂ gN .
Definition 2.1.8 The graph g is pairwise stable with respect to v and Y if
i) ∀ ij ∈ g, Yi(g, v) ≥ Yi(g − ij, v) and Yj(g, v) ≥ Yj(g − ij, v)
ii) ∀ ij /∈ g, Yi(g, v) > Yi(g + ij, v) then Yj(g, v) < Yj(g + ij, v)
2.2 The Connections Model
The connections model is constructed by Jackson and Wolinsky. It models social
communication among individuals. Individuals directly communicate with those
to whom they are linked. By the help of these direct connections, they also
benefit from those to whom their adjacent nodes are linked. However, the value of
communication decreases by distance. Moreover, direct communication is costly
so that individuals must weigh the benefits of a link against its cost.
Let wij ≥ 0 denotes the intrinsic value of player j to player i and cij denotes the
cost of maintaining the link ij to player i. The utility of each player i from graph
g is then
ui(g) = wii +
∑
j 6=i
δtijwij −
∑
j:ij∈g
cij,
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where tij is the number of links in the shortest path between players i and j (if
there is no path between two players then tij = ∞) and 0 < δ < 1 reflects the
idea that the value which individual i gets from being connected to individual j
is proportional to the proximity of j to i. Here, I should note that,
v(g) = Σi∈Nui(g).
In what follows, we will consider the symmetric version of the connections model
that is, cij = c, ∀ij and wij = 1, ∀j 6= i and wii = 0, ∀i ∈ N.
2.2.1 Stability in the Connections Model without Side
Payments
Here, we will remind some implications of stability for connections model without
side payments, where the allocation rule is Yi(g) = ui(g).
Proposition 2.2.1 The unique strongly efficient network in the symmetric con-
nections model is
i) the complete graph gN if c < δ − δ2
ii) a star1 encompassing everyone if δ − δ2 < c < δ + (N−2)
2
δ2
iii) no links if δ + (N−2)
2
δ2 < c.
Proof :
i) Given that c < δ − δ2, any two agents who are not directly connected will
improve their utilities and thus the total value by forming a link.
ii) and iii) Consider g′ a component of g containing m individuals. Let k−1 ≥
m be the number of links in this component. The values of these direct links are
1The term star describes a component in which all players are linked to a one central player
and there are no other links: g ⊂ gN is a star if g 6= ∅ and there exists i ∈ N such that jk ∈ g,
then either j = i or k = i. Individual i is the center of the star.
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k(2δ − 2c). This leaves at most m(m−1)
2
− k indirect links. The value of each
indirect link is at most 2δ2. Therefore, the overall value of the component is at
most
k(2δ − 2c) + (m(m− 1)− 2k))δ2 (2.1)
If this component is star then its value would be
(m− 1)(2δ − 2c) + (m− 1)(m− 2)δ2 (2.2)
Notice that, (2.1) − (2.2) = (k − (m − 1))(2δ − 2c − 2δ2), which is at most 0
since k ≥ m− 1 and c > δ − δ2 and less than 0 if k > m− 1. The value of this
component can equal the value of the star only when k = m − 1. Any graph
with k = m− 1, which is not a star, must have an indirect connection which has
a path longer than two, getting value less than 2δ2. Therefore, the value of the
indirect links will be below (m− 1)(m− 2)δ2, which is what one get with star.
Jackson and Wolinsky have shown that if c > δ − δ2, then any component of a
strongly efficient graph must be a star. Note that, any component of a strongly
efficient graph must have nonnegative value. In that case, a direct calculation
using (2.2) shows that a single star of m+ n individuals is greater in value than
separate stars of m and n individuals. Thus, if the strongly efficient graph is
nonempty, it must consist of a single star. Again, it follows from (2.2) that if a
star of n individuals has nonnegative value, then a star of n + 1 individuals has
higher value. Finally, to complete ii) and iii) notice that, a star encompassing
everyone has positive value only when δ + N−2
2
δ2 > c.
Proposition 2.2.2 In the symmetric connections model with Yi(g) = ui(g):
i) A pairwise stable network has at most one(non empty) component.
ii) For c < δ − δ2, the unique pairwise stable network is the complete graph, gN .
iii) For δ − δ2 < c < δ, a star encompassing all players is pairwise stable, but not
necessarily the unique pairwise stable graph.
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iv) For δ < c, any pairwise stable network which is nonempty is such that each
player has at least two links thus is inefficient.
Proof :
i) Suppose that g is pairwise stable and has two or more non-trivial compo-
nents. Let uij denotes the utility which accrues to i from the link ij, given the
rest of g: so uij = ui(g+ ij)−ui(g) if ij /∈ g and uij = ui(g)−ui(g− ij) if ij ∈ g.
Consider ij ∈ g, then uij ≥ 0. Let kl belong to a different component. Since i is
already in a component with j, but k is not, it follows that ukj > uij ≥ 0, since k
also receives δ2 in value for the indirect connection to i, which is not included in
uij. For similar reasons, ujk > ulk ≥ 0. This contradicts with pairwise stability,
jk /∈ g.
ii) It follows from the fact that, in this cost range, any two agents who are
not directly connected benefits from forming a link.
iii) It is straightforward to verify that the star is stable. It is the unique stable
graph in this cost range if N = 3, it is never the unique stable graph if N = 4.
(If δ − δ3 < c < δ, then a line is also stable.)
iv) In this cost range, pairwise stability precludes loose ends, so that every
connected agent has at least two links. This means that the star is not stable
and so by the previous proposition, any non empty pairwise stable graph must
be inefficient.
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CHAPTER 3
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF NETWORK FORMATION
In his paper entitled, ”A Dynamic Model of Network Formation” Alison Watts
extends Jackson and Wolinskys’ connections model to a dynamic framework.
3.1 Model
Jackson and Wolinsky analyze the symmetric connections model in a static frame-
work. They decide which networks are stable and which networks are efficient for
this model. However, they leave open the question of which stable networks will
form. Watts answers this question in his paper.
3.1.1 Static Model and Results
Watts examines the same symmetric connections model developed by Jackson
and Wolinsky(1996). However, Watts adopts a stability notion which is slightly
different than the one considered by Jackson and Wolinsky.
Definition 3.1.1 A graph g is stable if
i) ∀ ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij)
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ii) ∀ ij /∈ g, ui(g) > ui(g + ij − ig − jg) then uj(g) < uj(g + ij − ig − jg),
where ig is defined as follows: if agent i is directly linked to only agents
{k1, k2, k3, . . . , km} in graph g, then ig is any subset of {ik1, . . . , ikm}.
The results stated in the last chapter concerning stability and efficiency still holds
under this version of stability.
3.1.2 Dynamic Model
Initially, there are n players who are unconnected. The players meet over time
and then have the chance to form links with each other. Time, T is divided into
periods and is defined as a countable and an infinite set, {1, 2, 3, . . . , t, . . .}. Let
gt represents the network that exists at the end of period t and let each player
receives the payoff ui(gt), which is the same payoff function defined in Jackson
and Wolinskys’ symmetric connections model;
ui(gt) =
∑
j 6=i
δtij −
∑
j:ij∈g
c.
In each period, a link is randomly identified to be updated with uniform proba-
bility. A link ij which is identified is denoted by i : j. If link ij is already formed
that is ij ∈ gt−1 then either player i or j can sever this link. If link ij /∈ gt−1
then players i and j can bilaterally form this link and simultaneously sever any
of their other existing links under the condition that they both agree. Here, each
player is myopic, so players’ decisions are based on whether or not severing or
forming a link will increase their payoff in period t. If after some time period
t, no additional links are formed or broken, then the network formation process
reaches a stable state.
Proposition 3.1.2 If (δ−c) > δ2 > 0, then every link forms (as soon as possible)
and remains. If (δ − c) < 0, then no links ever form.
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Proof : Assume that, (δ − c) > δ2 > 0. Since δ < 1, we know that (δ − c) >
δ2 > δ3 > . . . > δn−1. Thus, each agent prefers a direct link to any indirect link.
Each period, two agents, say i and j, meet. If players i and j are not directly
connected, then they will each gain at least (δ − c) − δt(ij) > 0 from forming
a direct link, and so the connection will take place. Using the same reasoning
as above, if an agent ever breaks a direct link, his payoff will strictly decrease.
Therefore, no direct links are ever broken.
Assume (δ − c) < 0 and that initially no agents are linked. In the first time
period, two agents, say i and j, meet and have the opportunity to link. If such a
link is formed, then each agent will receive a payoff of (δ − c) < 0, since agents
are myopic, they will refuse to link. Thus, no links are formed in the first time
period. A similar analysis proves that no links are formed in later periods.
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CHAPTER 4
EXTENSION OF SYMMETRIC CONNECTIONS
MODEL
We slightly change the symmetric connections model. In symmetric connections
model, Jackson and Wolinsky do their analysis with the payoff function:
ui(g) =
∑
j 6=i
δtij −
∑
j:ij∈g
c.
Instead of assigning the same cost c to every direct link, we form a cost function
with the convention that when a player has more direct or indirect links, this
makes him more valuable for other individuals, so forming a link with him should
be more costly than others. Then, we assign weights to these links between two
players. We analyze both of these models in a dynamic framework and we impose
the condition that once a link is made it cannot be broken. Note that, throughout
this thesis, at figures, solid lines denote the links which are already formed, and
dash lines denote the links which are being formed.
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4.1 Extension of Symmetric Connections Model
without Weights and Nonconstant Total
Costs
First, consider the case where there are only 2 players i.e. N = {1, 2}. The link
between player 1 and player 2 will be formed if δ > c, where 0 < δ < 1 and c > 0,
since u1(gt), u2(gt) > 0.
Now, consider the case where there are 3 players i.e. N = {1, 2, 3}. There are 7
distinct graphs which can be formed between three players where there exists at
least one link in the graph. We focus on 4 of these graphs, where there are at
least two links in the graph. First, consider the situation, where there is a direct
link between player 1 and player 2 then player 2 and player 3 meet.
•1
•2 •3
.......................................... ....... ....... ....... ....... .......
We calculate the benefits of player 2 and player 3, when they do form the link 23.
If they form this link, player 2 obtains δ, since this link only provides him a direct
connection with player 3. However, player 3 obtains δ+δ2 by forming the link 23,
since this link provides him an indirect connection with player 1, besides a direct
link with player 2. We always assume that the total cost of cultivating a direct
link is 2c. These two players share this total cost proportional to their benefits.
Let c23
2 denotes the cost of link 23 for player 2. Similarly, let c23
3 denotes the
cost of link 23 for player 3. We have assumed that, the total cost of cultivating
the link 23 is 2c, so:
c23
2 + c23
3 = 2c
⇒c232 + (1 + δ)c232 = 2c
⇒2c232 + δc232 = 2c
⇒c232 = 2
2 + δ
c
⇒c233 = 21 + δ
2 + δ
c.
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Therefore, for player 2 to form this link the necessary and sufficient condition is:
2
2 + δ
c < δ.
Since c < δ, this condition is obviously satisfied. For player 3 to form this link
the necessary and sufficient condition is:
2
1 + δ
2 + δ
c < δ + δ2.
This condition holds, since both sides of this inequality are the same multiples
of the corresponding parts of the first inequality, needed for player 2 to form the
link 23. So, from now on we show one of the conditions needed for two players to
form a particular link and the other will directly follow because of the previous
argument.
Therefore, we concluded that the condition δ > c is both necessary and sufficient
for the link 23 to be formed.
Now, the links 12 and 23 are formed. Consider the case, where these two links
exist then player 1 and player 3 meet.
•1
•2 •3
............................................................................................................
....
.....
.....
.....
.
Player 1 gains δ from the link 13 and similarly player 3’s gain is δ. Here, we
should remind once more that, we take into account the links in the shortest
path when we calculate the payoffs of the players. Because of this assumption,
when player 1 and player 3 form this link they both give up from their indirect
connections to each other, so they both lose δ2. Thus, player 1’s benefit from link
13 is δ − δ2, also player 3’s benefit from this link is δ − δ2. Since their benefits
are the same, they share the total cost 2c equally. Therefore, complete graph is
formed if and only if δ− δ2 > c. The other possible meetings of 3 players exactly
require the condition δ − δ2 > c for complete graph to be formed. At this point,
a condition which is different than Jackson and Wolinsky’s is not required. So,
we continue to analyze this game with the player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
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Now, let N={1,2,3,4}. Assume that, there exist links between players 1 and 2,
players 1 and 3 then players 3 and 4 meet.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
....... ....... ....... .......
We decide whether link 34 is formed or not. This link is formed if both players’
payoffs are greater than 0. Obviously, player 3 gains δ by forming this link and
player 4 gains δ + δ2 + δ3, since, he benefits from the indirect connections which
are previously formed by player 3 with player 1 (δ2) and player 2 (δ3). Now, we
need to decide how total cost 2c is divided between these two players. Since, we
proportion total cost 2c according to benefits, we write
δk + (δ + δ2 + δ3)k = 2c.
Thus
k =
2c
2δ + δ2 + δ3
.
We conclude that, cost of forming link 34 to player 3 is
2c
2 + δ + δ2
and cost of forming link 34 to player 4 is
2c
δ(2 + δ + δ2)
(δ(1 + δ + δ2)) =
2c(1 + δ + δ2)
2 + δ + δ2
.
Now, we can set necessary and sufficient conditions for formation of link 34,
using previous calculations which informs us about benefits and costs of these
two players. Since
δ > c and
2
2 + δ + δ2
< 1
then
2c
2 + δ + δ2
< δ.
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So, player 3 desires to form this link. This last condition is also necessary and
sufficient for player 4 to form link 34. We can see this by multiplying the both
sides of this inequality by (1 + δ + δ2). This gives
δ + δ2 + δ3 >
2c(1 + δ + δ2)
2 + δ + δ2
,
which states that player 4’s net benefit is greater than 0, so he will desire to form
link 34.
Now, we proceed by assuming that link 34 is added to the graph and players
1 and 4 meet.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
Obviously, player 1 gains δ from this direct connection with player 4, but nothing
else, since we take into account the shortest path between two players. Thus
player 4’s direct connection with player 3 is worthless for player 1. However, as
it can be seen from the graph, player 1 has an indirect connection with player 4
and if he forms link 14, he looses the benefit which is provided by that indirect
connection. Thus, player 1’s benefit from link 14, should be noted as δ − δ2.
Player 4 gains δ from the direct connection with player 1. Moreover, if link 14
is formed, number of links between player 4 and player 2 decreases from 3 to
2. Thus, player 4 gains δ2, when he looses δ3. Also, player 4 looses his indirect
connection with player 1, i.e. −δ2. So, player 4’s benefit is
−δ2 − δ3 + δ + δ2 = δ − δ3.
As we did previously, we need to find the costs to players of forming link 14. We
know that
(δ − δ2)k + (δ − δ3)k = 2c
then
k =
2c
2δ − δ2 − δ3 .
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We conclude that, cost of forming link 14 to player 1 is
2c(1− δ)
2− δ − δ2
and cost of forming link 14 to player 4 is
2c(1− δ2)
2− δ − δ2 .
The necessary and sufficient condition for player 1 to form this link is
2c(1− δ)
2− δ − δ2 < δ − δ
2.
This inequality can be written as:
2c(1− δ)
2− δ − δ2 < δ(1− δ)⇒
2c
2− δ − δ2 < δ.
Since, 2
2−δ−δ2 < 1, 0 < δ < 1 and δ > c
1 we get
2c(1− δ)
2− δ − δ2 < δ(1− δ).
So, player 1 desires to form link 14. The necessary and sufficient condition for
player 4 to form link 14,
2c(1− δ2)
2− δ − δ2 < δ − δ
3
holds, since both sides of this inequality are the same multiples of the correspond-
ing parts of the first inequality, needed for player 1 to form the link 14. So, player
4 also desires to form this link.
Now, links 12, 13, 34 and 14 are formed. Assume that, players 2 and 4 meet.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.................................................
.......
.......
.......
.......
If these two players form this link then player 2’s and player 4’s payoffs will be
δ−δ2, so they share the total cost equally. The necessary and sufficient condition
1we assumed this condition, since it is required for complete graph to be formed.
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for link 24 to be formed is δ − δ2 > c. This condition is the same with the
condition which is sufficient for complete graph to be formed in the symmetric
connections model. Suppose that, this last condition is satisfied and link 24 is
formed. For complete graph to be formed, we should consider the case where
players 2 and 3 meet.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.................................................
...................................................
.....
.....
.....
....
.....
.....
Each of these two players gains δ−2δ2 from link 23, since both loose their indirect
connections with each other by forming this direct connection. Since their benefits
are the same, they share total cost 2c equally. Thus, δ−2δ2 > c is both necessary
and sufficient for link 23 to be formed. Note that, this last condition is a different
condition than those stated by Jackson and Wolinsky in symmetric connections
model, which are sufficient for complete graph to be reached.
We have reached this new condition as a result of a particular order in which
four players meet. If we change this ordering, we may end up with other new
conditions. So, we should do a similar analysis by changing the order in which
four players meet. I will briefly summarize our findings.
Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Suppose that, there exist links between players 1 and 2,
players 1 and 3, players 3 and 4 then players 2 and 4 meet.
Step 1:
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.......
.......
.......
.......
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 34
Link which can be formed: link 24
Benefit of player 2 form link 24: δ − δ3
Benefit of player 4 from link 24: δ − δ3
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Cost of the link 24 to player 2: c
Cost of the link 24 to player 4: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 24 to be formed by player 2: δ−δ3 > c.
This condition holds, since δ − δ3 > δ − 2δ2.2
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 24 to be formed by player 4: δ−δ3 > c.
This condition holds because of the same reason for player 2.
Step 2:
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
Links which are already formed: 12, 13, 24, 34
Link which can be formed: link 14
Benefit of player 1 form link 14: δ − 2δ2
Benefit of player 4 from link 14: δ − 2δ2
Cost of the link 14 to player 1: c
Cost of the link 14 to player 4: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 14 to be formed by player 1: δ−2δ2 > c.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 14 to be formed by player 4: δ−2δ2 > c.
Step 3:
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.................................................
.....
.....
.....
....
.....
.....
2we assumed this condition, since we have seen from previous results that, it is required for
complete graph to be formed.
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Links which are already formed: 12, 13, 24, 34, 14.
Link which can be formed: link 23
Benefit of player 2 form link 23: δ − 2δ2
Benefit of player 3 from link 23: δ − 2δ2
Cost of the link 23 to player 2: c
Cost of the link 23 to player 3: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 23 to be formed by player 2: δ−2δ2 > c.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 23 to be formed by player 3: δ−2δ2 > c.
We continued to analyze different orders in which four players meet, then we
performed this analysis for five players, also for six players. We observed that,
δ− (n− 2)δ2 > c is both necessary and sufficient condition for complete graph to
be formed. We will prove this at the end of this section.
Now, let N={1,2,3,4,5}.
Step 1:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
................................................
.....
.....
...
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24.
Link which can be formed: link 35
Benefit of player 3 form link 35: δ
Benefit of player 5 from link 35: δ + δ2 + δ3 + δ4
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Cost of the link 35 to player 3:
2c
2 + δ + δ2 + δ3
Cost of the link 35 to player 5:
2c(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3)
2 + δ + δ2 + δ3
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 35 to be formed by player 3:
2c
2 + δ + δ2 + δ3
< δ
This condition holds, since
2c
2 + δ + δ2 + δ3
< c < δ.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 35 to be formed by player 5:
2c(1 + δ + δ2 + δ3)
2 + δ + δ2 + δ3
< δ + δ2 + δ3 + δ4
This condition follows from the previous condition which is necessary and suffi-
cient for player 3 to form the link 35.
Step 2:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
.......................................................................
.....
.....
.....
...
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24, link 35.
Link which can be formed: link 45
Benefit of player 4 form link 45: δ − δ4
Benefit of player 5 from link 45: δ − δ4
Cost of the link 45 to player 4: c
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Cost of the link 45 to player 5: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 45 to be formed by player 4: δ−δ4 > c.
This condition holds, since δ − δ4 > δ − δ2 > c.3
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 45 to be formed by player 5: δ−δ4 > c.
This condition holds as we have shown at the last part.
Step 3:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
.......................................................................
............................
.....
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
...
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24, link 35, link 45.
Link which can be formed: link 15
Benefit of player 1 form link 15: δ − δ2
Benefit of player 5 from link 15: δ − δ2
Cost of the link 15 to player 1: c
Cost of the link 15 to player 5: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 15 to be formed by player 1: δ−δ2 > c.
This condition holds, since we have already assumed that δ−δ2 > c, for complete
graph to be formed in previous cases.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 15 to be formed by player 5: δ−δ2 > c.
This condition holds as we have shown at the last part.
3we assumed δ − δ2 > c, since we have seen from previous results that, it is required for
complete graph to be formed.
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Step 4:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
.......................................................................
............................
............................................................................
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24, link 35, link 45, link 15.
Link which can be formed: link 23
Benefit of player 2 form link 23: δ − δ2
Benefit of player 3 from link 23: δ − δ2
Cost of the link 23 to player 2: c
Cost of the link 23 to player 3: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 23 to be formed by player 2: δ−δ2 > c.
This condition holds, since we have already assumed that δ−δ2 > c, for complete
graph to be formed in previous cases.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 23 to be formed by player 3: δ−δ2 > c.
This condition holds as we have shown at the last part.
Step 5:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
.......................................................................
............................
............................................................................
........................................................ ..... ....... ....... .......
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24, link 35, link 45, link 15,
link 23.
Link which can be formed: link 34
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Benefit of player 3 form link 34: δ − 2δ2
Benefit of player 4 from link 34: δ − 2δ2
Cost of the link 34 to player 3: c
Cost of the link 34 to player 4: c
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 34 to be formed by player 3: δ−2δ2 > c.
This condition holds, since we have already assumed that δ−2δ2 > c, for complete
graph to be formed in previous cases.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 34 to be formed by player 4: δ−2δ2 > c.
This condition holds as we have shown at the last part.
Step 6:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
.......................................................................
............................
............................................................................
..........................................................................................................
....
.......
.......
.......
.......
.......
...
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24, link 35, link 45, link 15,
link 23, link 34.
Link which can be formed: link 25
Benefit of player 2 form link 25: δ − 3δ2
Benefit of player 5 from link 25: δ − 3δ2
Cost of the link 25 to player 2: c
Cost of the link 25 to player 5: c
Necessary and Sufficient condition for link 25 to be formed by player 2: δ−3δ2 > c.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 25 to be formed by player 5: δ−3δ2 > c.
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Step 7:
•1 •2
•3 •4
•
5
.....................................................................................................
.......................................................................
............................
............................................................................
..........................................................................................................
.........................................................................
....
.....
.....
....
.....
.....
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 24, link 35, link 45, link 15,
link 23, link 34, link 25.
Link which can be formed: link 14
Benefit of player 1 form link 14: δ − 3δ2
Benefit of player 4 from link 14: δ − 3δ2
Cost of the link 14 to player 1: c
Cost of the link 14 to player 4: c
Necessary and Sufficient condition for link 14 to be formed by player 1: δ−3δ2 > c.
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 14 to be formed by player 4: δ−3δ2 > c.
These two last conditions are different conditions than those we have found which
are necessary and sufficient for complete graph to be reached, so we need to impose
δ−3δ2 as a new condition for complete graph to be formed. As we have mentioned
we observed that, δ− (n− 2)δ2 > c is both necessary and sufficient condition for
complete graph to be formed for n players. Now, we will prove this observation.
Theorem 4.1.1 ∀n ∈ N, complete graph forms if and only if ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
the following condition is satisfied
δ − (n− 2)δ2 > c. (4.1)
Proof : First of all let us prove that 4.1 is a sufficient condition for complete
graph to be formed. Let t0 be any time and fixed. Let at time t0, player i and
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player j meet. Let there are k ≥ 0 players who have formed paths with the
shortest length between players i and j. Let there are m ≥ 0 players who are
connected to player i and connected to player j via player i and those k players.
Let there are p ≥ 0 players who are connected to player j and connected to player
i via player j and those k players. Note that, k +m+ p ≤ n− 2. Let Bi denotes
the benefit of player i from link ij, Bj denotes the benefit of player j from link
ij, Ci denotes the cost of player i from link ij, Cj denotes the cost of player j
from link ij.
Note that, when m = p = 0, k = n − 2, where player i and player j form links
via k players, {k1, k2, . . . , kk}, with length 2, we have
Bi = Bj = δ − δ2(n− 2),
Ci = Cj = c.
Note that, the condition
δ − δ2(n− 2) > c (4.2)
satisfies Bi > Ci and Bj > Cj.
Hence, in this case the link between player i and player j forms.
Moreover, when k = 0, m ≥ 0, p ≥ 0, where player i has links with m players
with length 1 and player j has links with p players with length 1, we have
Bi = δ + δ
2p
Bj = δ + δ
2m
Ci =
2c(δ + δ2p)
2δ + δ2(m+ p)
Cj =
2c(δ + δ2m)
2δ + δ2(m+ p)
Note that, the condition
δ > c (4.3)
satisfies Bi > Ci and Bj > Cj. Hence, in this case the link between player i and
player j forms.
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Furthermore, note that, for any combination of m, k, p, with arbitrary path
lengths, the sufficient condition for forming link ij is restricted by condition 4.2
and condition 4.3. Therefore, the condition 4.1 is sufficient for complete graph to
be formed by n players.
Now, let us prove that 4.1 is a necessary condition for complete graph to be
formed. We use induction method to prove this part. Note that, we have shown
that for three players case, if complete graph is formed then ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we
have
δ − δ2 > c.
Now assume that for n − 1 players, if complete graph is formed, then we have
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1},
δ − δ2(n− 1) > c.
Now, let us add player n to the game. Let without loss of generality, first of all,
player 1 and player n form a link, then
B1 = δ,
Bn = δ + δ
2(n− 2),
C1 =
2c
2 + δ(n− 2) ,
Cn =
2c(1 + δ(n− 2))
2 + δ(n− 2) .
Note that, B1 > C1, Bn > Cn holds since the condition δ > c is satisfied, due to
induction assumption. Now let player 2 and player n form a link, then
B2 = Bn = δ − δ2,
C2 = Cn = c.
Hence, B2 = Bn > C2 = Cn holds since the condition δ − δ2 > c is satisfied, as a
result of induction assumption.
Similarly, let player n forms links with player 1,. . ., player k−1, then the condition
δ − δ2(k − 1) > c is necessary for player k and player n to form a link. Thus, if
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complete graph forms, then
δ − δ2(n− 2) > c.
holds.
Corollary 4.1.2 If δ − (n− 2)δ2 > c then complete graph is stable.
4.2 Extension of Symmetric Connections Model
with Weights and Nonconstant Cost
In section 4.1, we have shown that, for n players, complete graph forms if and
only if δ − (n− 2)δ2 > c. Here, one should notice that for this condition to hold
1
n−2 > δ is required. So, ∀n ∈ N, we can not have complete graph.
We desire to analyze the complete graph formation for all n ∈ N. In this section,
we assign a weight to each link that can be formed between any two players. We
denote the weight which is assigned to the link between players x and y with
f(x, y) and we assume that f(x, y) = f(y, x) and f(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, we
denote the total cost of the link between players x and y with 2c(x, y) and we
assume that c(x, y) = c(y, x) with δ > c(x, y) > 0. Our other assumptions are the
same as the ones in section 4.1. However, from now on, the order in which players
meet is important for us, since they are not identical anymore. We perform the
same analysis in the previous section.
We first analyze the two players case i.e. N = {1, 2}. We will assume that
δ > c(1, 2). Suppose that, player 1 and player 2 meet. Obviously, they form a
link if f(1, 2)δ > c(1, 2), i.e. f(1, 2) > c(1,2)
δ
.
Now, we will consider the case where there are 3 players, N = {1, 2, 3}. Suppose
that, link 12 is formed and player 1 and player 3 meet.
•1
•2 •3
...................................
....
.....
.....
.....
.
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Since link 12 has already been formed, we have f(1, 2) > c(1,2)
δ
. We again start
by calculating the benefits of players and then costs to players to observe the
conditions which are necessary and sufficient for link 13 to be formed. The benefit
of player 1 from this link is
δf(1, 3).
The benefit of player 3 from this link is
δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 2)f(1, 3) = δf(1, 3)[1 + δf(1, 2)]
since player 3 gains an indirect connection with player 2 by forming a direct
connection with player 1. The intuition behind multiplying the second term by
f(1, 2) is that player 3 benefits from player 2 through player 1. The cost to
players of forming link 13 is again proportional to their benefits and total cost of
cultivating this link is 2c(1, 3). Thus
[δf(1, 3)]k + δf(1, 3)[1 + δf(1, 2)]k = 2c(1, 3)
then
k =
2c(1, 3)
δf(1, 3)[2 + δf(1, 2)]
.
So, cost to player 1 of forming link 13 is
2c(1, 3)
2 + δf(1, 2)
and cost to player 3 of link 13 is
2c(1, 3)[1 + δf(1, 2)]
2 + δf(1, 2)
.
We conclude that, player 1 desires to form link 13 if and only if
δf(1, 3) >
2c(1, 3)
2 + δf(1, 2)
and player 3 desires to form link 13 if and only if
δf(1, 3)[1 + δf(1, 2)] >
2c(1, 3)[1 + δf(1, 2)]
2 + δf(1, 2)
.
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Actually, if we divide both sides of the last inequality by [1 + δf(1, 2)], we end
up with the same condition for player 1 to form link 13, that is
δf(1, 3) >
2c(1, 3)
2 + δf(1, 2)
.
Therefore,
f(1, 3) >
2c(1, 3)
δ(2 + δf(1, 2))
is both necessary and sufficient condition for this link to be formed. This condition
holds if and only if
f(1, 3) >
c(1, 3)
δ
,
since
2
2 + δf(1, 2)
< 1.
Now, suppose that links 12 and 13 are formed then player 2 and player 3 meet.
•1
•2 •3
...................................
......................................... ....... ....... ....... ....... .......
If link 23 is formed then both players gain δf(2, 3), but they both loose their
indirect connections with each other, that is δ2f(1, 2)f(1, 3). Thus, link 23 is
formed if and only if δf(2, 3)−δ2f(1, 2)f(1, 3) > c(2, 3). Hence, for 3 player case,
complete graph is reached if and only if ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} with i 6= j, we have
δf(i, j)− δ2
3∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j).
Now, let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Assume that, links 12 and 13 are formed then player 3
and player 4 meet.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
....... ....... ....... .......
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If player 3 forms link 34 then he will gain
δf(3, 4)
where as player 4 will gain
δf(3, 4) + δ2f(3, 4)f(3, 1) + δ3f(3, 4)f(3, 1)f(1, 2).
When player 4 forms this direct link with player 3, he also benefits from player
3’s connections from player 1 and player 2. Player 4 will benefit from player 1
through the link he will form with player 3 and then player 3’s direct connection
with player 1. We denote this situation by writing
δ2f(3, 4)f(3, 1).
Similarly, player 4 will benefit from player 2 through the links 34, 13, 12 that is
δ3f(3, 4)f(3, 1)f(1, 2).
Thus
[δf(3, 4)]k + [δf(3, 4) + δ2f(3, 4)f(3, 1) + δ3f(3, 4)f(3, 1)f(1, 2)]k = 2c(3, 4)
then
k =
2c(3, 4)
δf(3, 4)[2 + δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 3)f(1, 2)]
.
This result yields that, cost of player 3 from forming link 34 is
2c(3, 4)
2 + δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 3)f(1, 2)
and cost of player 4 from forming link 34 is
2c(3, 4)[2 + δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 3)f(1, 2)]
2 + δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 3)f(1, 2)
.
We conclude that, link 34 is formed if and only if
δf(3, 4) >
2c(3, 4)
2 + δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 3)f(1, 2)
.
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This condition holds if and only if
f(3, 4) >
c(3, 4)
δ
,
since
2
2 + δf(1, 3) + δ2f(1, 3)f(1, 2)
< 1.
Step 1: Now, suppose that links 12, 13 and 34 are formed then players 1 and 4
meet.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
We summarize our findings:
Benefit of player 1 form link 14:
δf(1, 4)− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4) = δ[f(1, 4)− δf(1, 3)f(3, 4)].
Benefit of player 4 from link 14:
−δ2f(3, 4)f(1, 3)− δ3f(3, 4)f(1, 3)f(1, 2) + δf(1, 4) + δ2f(1, 4)f(1, 2) =
δf(1, 4)[1 + δf(1, 2)]− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4)[1 + δf(1, 2)] =
δ[1 + δf(1, 2)][f(1, 4)− δf(1, 3)f(3, 4)].
Cost of the link 14 to player 1:
2c(1, 4)
2 + δf(1, 2)
Cost of the link 14 to player 4:
2c(1, 4)[1 + δf(1, 2)]
2 + δf(1, 2)
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 14 to be formed by player 1:
δ[f(1, 4)− δf(1, 3)f(3, 4)] > 2c(1, 4)
2 + δf(1, 2)
.
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Necessary and sufficient condition for link 14 to be formed by player 4:
δ[1 + δf(1, 2)][f(1, 4)− δf(1, 3)f(3, 4)] > 2c(1, 4)[1 + δf(1, 2)]
2 + δf(1, 2)
.
Obviously, these two necessary and sufficient conditions are equivalent, so it is
enough for us to focus on one of them to decide whether or not link 14 is formed.
I will consider the necessary and sufficient condition for player 1:
δ[f(1, 4)− δf(1, 3)f(3, 4)] > 2c(1, 4)
2 + δf(1, 2)
⇒ [2 + δf(1, 2)][δf(1, 4)− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4)]
> (2 + c(1, 4))[δf(1, 4)− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4)].
If
[δf(1, 4)− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4)] > c(1, 4)
⇒(2 + c(1, 4))[δf(1, 4)− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4)] > 2c(1, 4) + (c(1, 4))2 > 2c(1, 4).
We conclude that, link 14 is formed if and only if
[δf(1, 4)− δ2f(1, 3)f(3, 4)] > c(1, 4).
Step 2: Assume that link 14 is formed.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.................................................
.......
.......
.......
.......
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 34 and link 14
Link which can be formed: link 24
Benefit of player 2 form link 24:
δf(2, 4)− δ2f(1, 2)f(1, 4).
Benefit of player 4 from link 24:
δf(2, 4)− δ2f(1, 2)f(1, 4).
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Cost of the link 24 to player 2: c(2, 4)
Cost of the link 24 to player 4: c(2, 4)
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 24:
δf(2, 4)− δ2f(1, 2)f(1, 4) > c(2, 4)
Step 3: Assume that link 24 is formed.
•1 •2
•3 •4
...................................................
...................................................
...................................................
.................................................
...................................................
.....
.....
.....
....
.....
.....
Links which are already formed: link 12, link 13, link 34, link 14 and link 24
Link which can be formed: link 23
Benefit of player 2 form link 23:
δf(2, 3)− δ2[f(1, 2)f(1, 3) + f(2, 4)f(3, 4)]
Benefit of player 3 from link 23:
δf(2, 3)− δ2[f(1, 2)f(1, 3) + f(2, 4)f(3, 4)]
Cost of the link 23 to player 2: c(2, 3)
Cost of the link 23 to player 3: c(2, 3)
Necessary and sufficient condition for link 23 to be formed is:
δf(2, 3)− δ2[f(1, 2)f(1, 3) + f(2, 4)f(3, 4)] > c(2, 3)
If we perform this analysis for all possible orders in which players meet, then we
obtain the following result:
For four players case, the complete graph forms if and only if ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
with i 6= j, we have
δf(i, j)− δ2
4∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j).
33
Here, we observed that necessity and sufficiency condition for complete graph
formation can be generalized in the following way:
Theorem 4.2.1 ∀n ∈ N, complete graph forms if and only if ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
with i 6= j, the following condition is satisfied
δf(i, j)− δ2
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j). (4.4)
Proof : First of all, let us prove that 4.7 is a sufficient condition for complete
graph to be formed. Let t0 be any time and fixed. Let at time t0, player i and
player j meet. Let there are k ≥ 0 players who have formed paths with the
shortest length between players i and j. Let there are m ≥ 0 players who are
connected to player i and connected to player j via player i and those k players.
Let there are p ≥ 0 players who are connected to player j and connected to player
i via player j and those k players. Note that, k +m+ p ≤ n− 2. Let Bi denotes
the benefit of player i from link ij, Bj denotes the benefit of player j from link
ij, Ci denotes the cost of player i from link ij, Cj denotes the cost of player j
from link ij.
Note that, when m = p = 0, k = n − 2, where player i and player j form links
via k players, {k1, k2, . . . , kk}, with length 2, we have
Bi = Bj = δf(i, j)− δ2
n−2∑
l=1
f(i, kl)f(j, kl),
Ci = Cj = c(i, j).
Note that, the condition
δf(i, j)− δ2
n−2∑
l=1
f(i, kl)f(j, kl) > c(i, j) (4.5)
satisfies Bi > Ci and Bj > Cj. Hence, in this case the link between player i and
player j forms.
Moreover, when k = 0, m ≥ 0, p ≥ 0, where player i has links with m players,
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{m1, . . . ,mm}, with length 1 and player j has links with p players, {p1, . . . , pp},
with length 1, we have
Bi = δf(i, j) + δ
2f(i, j)
p∑
k=1
f(j, pk)
Bj = δf(i, j) + δ
2f(i, j)
m∑
k=1
f(i,mk)
Ci =
2c(i, j)(δf(i, j) + δ2f(i, j)
∑p
k=1 f(j, pk))
2δf(i, j) + δ2f(i, j)(
∑p
k=1 f(j, pk) +
∑m
k=1 f(i,mk))
Cj =
2c(i, j)(δf(i, j) + δ2f(i, j)
∑m
k=1 f(i,mk))
2δf(i, j) + δ2f(i, j)(
∑p
k=1 f(j, pk) +
∑m
k=1 f(i,mk))
Note that, the condition
δf(i, j) > c(i, j) (4.6)
satisfies Bi > Ci and Bj > Cj. Hence, in this case the link between player i and
player j forms.
Furthermore, note that, for any combination of m, k, p, with arbitrary path
lengths, the sufficient condition for forming link ij is restricted by condition 4.5
and condition 4.6. Therefore, the condition 4.7 is sufficient for complete graph to
be formed by n players.
Now, let us prove that 4.7 is a necessary condition for complete graph to be
formed. We use induction method to prove this part. Note that, we have shown
that for three players case, if complete graph is formed then ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we
have
δf(i, j)− δ2
3∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j).
Now assume that for n − 1 players, if complete graph is formed, then we have
∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1},
δf(i, j)− δ2
n−1∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j).
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Now, let us add player n to the game. Let without loss of generality, first of all,
player 1 and player n form a link, then
B1 = δf(1, n),
Bn = δf(1, n) + δ
2f(1, n)
n−1∑
k=2
f(1, k),
C1 =
2c(1, n)
2 + δ
∑n−1
k=2 f(1, k)
,
Cn =
2c(1, n)(1 + δ
∑n−1
k=2 f(1, k))
2 + δ
∑n−1
k=2 f(1, k)
.
Note that, B1 > C1, Bn > Cn holds if the condition δf(1, n) > c(1, n) is satisfied.
Now let player 2 and player n form a link, then
B2 = Bn = δf(2, n)− δ2f(1, 2)f(1, n),
C2 = Cn = c(2, n).
Hence, B2 = Bn > C2 = Cn holds if the condition δf(2, n) − δ2f(1, 2)f(1, n) >
c(2, n) is satisfied.
Similarly, let player n forms links with player 1,. . ., player k−1, then the condition
δf(k, n)− δ2∑k−1l=1 f(l, n)f(k, l) > c(k, n) is necessary for player k to form a link
with player n. Thus, if complete graph forms, then ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} with
i 6= j,
δf(i, j)− δ2
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j).
holds.
Corollary 4.2.2 If ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with i 6= j, the following condition is sat-
isfied
δf(i, j)− δ2
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
f(l, i)f(l, j) > c(i, j).
then complete graph is stable.
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Example 1 Let f(i, j) =
(
1
ij
)α
, c(i, j) =
(
1
ij
)α+k
such that α ≥ 1 and δ be fixed
reel number such that 6
pi2
> δ > 0. Then, we need to find k such that(
1
ij
)α
− δ
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
(
1
ijl2
)α
>
(
1
ij
)α+k
1
δ
.
holds ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} with i 6= j. That is
(ij)k >
1
δ
 11− δ∑nl=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
1
l2α
 .
Note that
(ij)k ≥ 2k.
Moreover  11− δ∑nl=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
1
l2α
 ≤
(
1
1− δ pi2
6
)
since
n∑
l=1
1
l2
=
pi2
6
.
Thus, if we choose k such that
k >
log
(
1
1−δ pi2
6
)
− log δ
log 2
, (4.7)
we have (
1
ij
)α
− δ
n∑
l=1
l 6=i
l 6=j
(
1
ijl2
)α
>
(
1
ij
)α+k
1
δ
.
∀n ∈ N. Thus, complete graph forms for any number of players with condition
(4.7) with assumptions which are specified at the beginning of the example.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, We have concluded that, it is possible to reach to the complete
graph ∀n ∈ N by assigning weights to direct links between any to players in the
game which we have extended. These weights can be thought as if they represent
the performance of the players in the game. As illustrated by the example, for
any two players i and j, we can find f(i, j) and c(i, j) in neighbourhood of zero
such that the complete graph is reached.
38
39 
 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
Watts, Alison. 2001. “A Dynamic Model of Network Formation,” Games and 
Economic Behaviour: 331-341. 
Wolinsky Asher and Matthew O. Jackson. 1996. “A Strategic Model of Social and 
Economic Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory: 44-74. 
Jackson M.O. 2003. “A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and 
Efficiency,” Group Formation in Economics: 228-277. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
